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Privacy Rights Left Behind at the Border: The 
Exhaustive, Exploratory Searches Effectuated in 
United States v. Cotterman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in computer technology have allowed more 
information to be stored digitally and have permitted a greater 
number of people to own a personal computer. Additionally, legal 
professionals increasingly use digital information as sources for 
evidence in criminal cases.1 The use of computers presents new 
questions and problems for traditional Fourth Amendment search-
and-seizure doctrines.2 For example, does the information storage-
capacity of computers, and the highly personal information stored 
therein heighten personal privacy interests in computers above those 
in traditional documents? Additionally, should the government be 
limited in its electronic searches of personal computers or in its 
ability to recover deleted or discarded information on a personal 
computer? Courts confronted with cases regarding searches and 
seizures of computers need to adequately recognize and carefully 
analyze the new and unique characteristics of computers, or else the 
courts will fail to respect the proper balance between individual 
citizens’ privacy interests and the government’s interests in enforcing 
the law.  
In United States v. Cotterman,3 the Ninth Circuit failed to 
recognize a proper balance of Fourth Amendment interests and erred 
in holding that a border search of a laptop in a forensic computer 
laboratory is constitutional absent reasonable suspicion.4 The court 
failed to adequately weigh individual privacy interests against the 
government’s interests in performing its Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness evaluation. The court also failed to recognize that a 
forensic search of a computer is particularly offensive. The Ninth 
Circuit should have recognized the distinct privacy interests that are 
 
 1. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532 
(2005). 
 2. Id. at 533. 
 3. 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 4. Id. at 1070. 
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violated by a forensic computer examination and should have 
required reasonable suspicion. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT RESTRICTION ON SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES AND THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.5 Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable 
unless government agents have probable cause that a crime has been, 
or is being, committed.6 However, many exceptions to the general 
rule exist. For example, some searches require only reasonable 
suspicion of the commission of a crime,7 which is a lower standard of 
proof than probable cause.8 Other searches require no suspicion at 
all.9 
The exception to the probable-cause requirement pertinent to 
Cotterman is the border-search doctrine. Two Supreme Court cases 
and one Ninth Circuit case have developed the border-search 
doctrine regarding searches of computers and whether reasonable 
suspicion is required. This Note discusses the basics of the border-
search doctrine and these cases below. 
To begin, the premise of the border-search doctrine is that 
“searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of 
the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (2010). “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and 
circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175–76 (1949) (second alteration in original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 162 (1925)). 
 7. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that reasonable suspicion is sufficient 
to justify a temporary investigatory detention and a quick search for weapons). Reasonable 
suspicion exists when a law enforcement officer has “specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion” caused 
by the search or seizure. Id. at 21. 
 8. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less 
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be 
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to 
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from 
information that is less reliable . . . .”). 
 9. For example, searches based on the searched party’s consent do not require any level 
of suspicion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). 
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and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by 
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”10 The rationale for 
the doctrine is that border searches and seizures “are justified by the 
national interests of the sovereign state in preventing the entry of 
undesirable persons and prohibited goods.”11 Additionally, 
individuals have a lower expectation of privacy at the border because 
a reasonable person understands that she is subject to customs 
inspections when entering a country.12 While the Constitution 
permits routine border searches and seizures without any 
particularized suspicion, some nonroutine searches and seizures at 
the border require reasonable suspicion.13 
A. Reasonable Suspicion at the Border: Montoya de Hernandez 
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court 
held that reasonable suspicion justified detention—or temporary 
seizure—of a traveler “beyond the scope of a routine customs search 
and inspection,” in which the traveler was suspected of alimentary-
canal smuggling.14 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
determination that a standard of proof higher than reasonable 
suspicion was required for a nonroutine border detention.15 Rather, 
the Court concluded that reasonable suspicion was sufficient to 
detain a traveler based on a traditional reasonableness analysis. The 
Court’s reasonableness analysis weighed the government’s increased 
interest in protecting its borders from illegal drugs—particularly in 
light of the increase in (and difficulty of detecting) alimentary-canal 
smuggling16—against the defendant’s reduced privacy interests.17 
 
 10. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). See id. at 616–20 for further 
discussion. 
 11. Sara M. Smyth, Searches of Computers and Computer Data at the United States 
Border: The Need for a New Framework Following United States v. Arnold, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 69, 73 (2009). 
 12. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
 13. See Smyth, supra note 11, at 73; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. The 
Supreme Court has not defined what makes a search “routine” or “nonroutine.” 
 14. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. Alimentary-canal smuggling occurs when a 
person tries to transport drugs by swallowing balloons filled with drugs. Id. at 534. 
 15. Id. at 540. 
 16. Id. at 538–39. 
 17. Id. at 539–40 (“Balanced against the sovereign’s interests at the border are the 
Fourth Amendment rights of respondent.”). 
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While the Court in Montoya de Hernandez established that 
reasonable suspicion was sufficient for a nonroutine, temporary 
seizure of a person,18 it explicitly refrained from holding what level of 
suspicion, if any, would be required for a nonroutine search.19 
B. No Suspicion Necessary for a Search of a Vehicle: Flores-Montano 
The Supreme Court addressed whether reasonable suspicion was 
required for a vehicle search at the border in United States v. Flores-
Montano.20 In Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court held that no 
suspicion was necessary for the government “to remove, disassemble, 
and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank” at the border.21 The Ninth 
Circuit had previously held that a nonroutine search required 
reasonable suspicion based on language from Montoya de Hernandez, 
and therefore the Court reasoned that a fuel tank search qualified for 
reasonable-suspicion classification.22 However, the Supreme Court 
rejected the Ninth Circuit rule and reliance on classification of 
searches as nonroutine because “the reasons that might support a 
requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive 
searches of the person—dignity and privacy interests of the person 
being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles.”23 
The Court then engaged in a traditional reasonableness analysis. 
It emphasized the government’s interest in preventing drug 
smuggling in gas tanks,24 and weighed those interests against the 
privacy interests in a vehicle. The Court reasoned that a person’s 
expectation of privacy is lower in her gas tank than in the passenger 
compartment of a car; and since a person at the border cannot expect 
privacy in the passenger compartment of her car, she cannot expect 
privacy in her gas tank.25 Finally, the Court reasoned that the search 
 
 18. As mentioned in footnote 13, the Supreme Court did not define what makes a 
search or seizure “routine.” However, the seizure in Montoya de Hernandez is an example of 
what the Court considered “nonroutine.” In Montoya de Hernandez, customs officials detained 
the defendant in the customs office for sixteen hours while waiting for the traveler to defecate. 
Id. at 535. 
 19. Id. at 541 n.4. 
 20. 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 21. Id. at 155. 
 22. See id. at 152. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 153–54. In the five-and-one-half fiscal years leading up to the case, 4,619 
vehicles had been seized because of drugs hidden in the gas tank. Id. at 153. 
 25. See id. at 154. 
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was not “particularly offensive,” and thus did not violate legitimate 
privacy rights.26 Following this analysis, the Court held that the 
search was reasonable, even without reasonable suspicion. 
In Flores-Montano, the Court “[left] open the question whether, 
and under what circumstances, a border search [without reasonable 
suspicion] might be deemed unreasonable because of the particularly 
offensive manner in which it is carried out.”27 However, the Court 
indicated that reasonable suspicion may be required where the search 
or seizure is “highly intrusive,” and it implicates the “dignity and 
privacy interests of the person being searched.”28 Additionally, the 
cases that the Court cites in support of finding unreasonableness 
based on the “particularly offensive manner” of a search29 are 
Kremen v. United States30 and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States.31 The searches in those cases were particularly offensive 
because they were “exhaustive,” “general exploratory search[es].”32 
In short, Montoya de Hernandez and Flores-Montano offered few 
bright-line rules to follow when determining whether reasonable 
suspicion is necessary for a border search or seizure. Rather than rely 
on categories such as “routine”33 or “intrusive,”34 the Supreme 
Court instead engaged in a traditional Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness test in which it weighed heightened government 
interests against an individual’s lessened expectation of privacy at the 
border.35 To require reasonable suspicion, individual privacy interests 
must be exceptionally high because the “balance between the 
interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual 
is . . . struck much more favorably to the Government at the 
 
 26. Id. at 154 n.2. 
 27. Id. (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 28. Id. at 152. 
 29. Id. at 154 n.2 (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13). 
 30. 353 U.S. 346 (1957). 
 31. 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
 32. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1086 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 1080 (majority opinion). 
 34. Id. 
 35. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004); United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985) (“Balanced against the sovereign’s 
interests at the border are the Fourth Amendment rights of respondent.”).  
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border.”36 Finally, the search may be unreasonable—absent 
reasonable suspicion—if the search is exhaustive and exploratory. 
C. No Reasonable Suspicion for Basic Computer Searches: Arnold 
In United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether 
searching a laptop at the border is reasonable. The court held that 
searching the digital information of a laptop was reasonable without 
reasonable suspicion37 where the search consisted of the border agent 
clicking through some files on the laptop’s desktop in the presence 
of the defendant.38 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the manner of 
the search was not particularly offensive because the court compared 
the laptop to a luggage-like container (notwithstanding the storage 
capacity of computers), which can be searched without suspicion at 
the border.39 
III. COTTERMAN FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 6, 2007, Howard Cotterman and his wife, Maureen, 
drove from Mexico to the port of entry in Lukeville, Arizona and 
presented themselves for admission into the United States with their 
United States passports.40 The Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) officer, following standard procedure, checked the 
passports against the CBP electronic database and found an alert on 
Cotterman’s passport.41 The alert42 notified the CBP officer that 
Cotterman had been convicted of “two counts of use of a minor in 
sexual conduct, two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a 
child, and three counts of child molestation.”43 The alert further 




 36. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540. 
 37. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 38. Id. at 1005. 
 39. Id. at 1009–10. 
 40. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 41. Id. at 1071. 
 42. The alert “was part of Operation Angel Watch, which combats child sex tourism by 
flagging sex offenders who target children and frequently travel outside the United States.” Id. 
at 1071 n.2. 
 43. Id. at 1071. 
 44. Id. 
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Due to the alert, the CBP officer detained the Cottermans for a 
more thorough search and contacted Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”).45 ICE agents instructed the border agents to 
check anything the Cottermans might have that could contain child 
pornography.46 CBP officers checked Cotterman’s vehicle and found 
two laptops, one belonging to Cotterman and one belonging to 
Maureen, and three digital cameras.47 After checking the cameras and 
the laptops, the officers found no child pornography.48 However, the 
officers could not access several password-protected files on 
Cotterman’s laptop.49 
Soon thereafter, two ICE agents arrived at the Lukeville Port of 
Entry to assist in the search.50 These agents interviewed Cotterman, 
who offered to help the agents gain access to the password-protected 
files in his computer.51 However, the agents refused his help because 
they were concerned that if Cotterman had access to his computer, 
he would be able to delete or hide some of the files without them 
knowing.52 The ICE agents instead decided to confiscate the two 
laptops and one of the cameras for a forensic examination.53 After the 
interview, the ICE agents released the Cottermans and took the 
laptops and camera to the ICE office in Tucson, Arizona for the 
forensic examination.54 
The next day, the ICE forensic examiner made copies of the 
computers’ hard drives and of the camera’s memory card.55 The 
forensic examiner, Agent John Owen, found nothing when he 
examined the camera memory card and released it that same day.56 
Agent Owen then left his examination scripts running overnight to 
analyze the computer hard drives.57 
 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1071–72. 
 53. Id. at 1072. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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On Sunday morning, Agent Owen began examining the laptop 
hard drives.58 He found nothing on Maureen’s laptop, but he found 
seventy-five images of child pornography in the unallocated space59 
of Cotterman’s laptop.60 Agent Owen tried to contact Cotterman 
but learned after two days that Cotterman had fled to Sydney, 
Australia.61 Agent Owen then continued to search Cotterman’s 
laptop, and he soon found 378 images of child pornography.62 Many 
of the images depicted Cotterman sexually molesting a child.63 Over 
the next few months, Agent Owen discovered hundreds more 
pornographic images, videos, and stories depicting children.64 
On June 27, 2009, the United States charged Cotterman in 
connection with the images found on his laptop.65 After Cotterman 
was extradited from Australia, he moved to suppress the evidence 
found on his laptop.66 The district-court judge granted Cotterman’s 
motion,67 and the United States appealed.68 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN COTTERMAN 
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by 
determining that the search and seizure of Cotterman’s laptops fell 
under the border-search doctrine.69 The court then identified three 
categories of inappropriate borders searches: “highly intrusive 
searches of a person,” searches that destroy property, and searches 
performed in a “particularly offensive manner.”70 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. “Unallocated space is space on the hard drive where a computer stores digital 
information that has been erased by the computer user or information from web sites the 
computer has visited.” Id. at 1072 n.5. 
 60. Id. at 1072. 
 61. Id. at 1072–73. 
 62. Id. at 1073. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Cotterman was charged with “production of child pornography, transportation and 
shipping of child pornography, receipt of child pornography, possession of child pornography, 
importation of obscene material, transportation of obscene material, and unlawful flight to 
avoid prosecution.” Id. 
 66. He moved to suppress on April 18, 2008. Id. 
 67. The district judge granted the motion and made some factual findings on February 
23, 2009. Id. 
 68. The government appealed on March 19, 2009. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1074–79. 
 70. Id. at 1079–80. 
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The court quickly dismissed the first two categories and focused 
its analysis on the last, whether ICE performed the search in a 
“particularly offensive manner.”71 To determine whether the search 
was particularly offensive, the court addressed Cotterman’s two 
arguments.72 
First, Cotterman argued that the search was offensive because it 
was unnecessary to take the laptop to Tucson for a forensic search 
since he had offered to help the ICE agents gain access to the 
password-protected files.73 The court rejected this argument because 
it determined that the ICE agents’ concerns about Cotterman hiding 
or deleting the files were reasonable.74 The court further doubted 
Cotterman’s true willingness to help, given the fact that he fled the 
country to avoid prosecution.75 
Cotterman’s second argument was that the duration of the 
seizure—two days—made it particularly offensive.76 The court 
analyzed this argument by considering the steps that the ICE agents 
took to perform their search. It concluded that the length of time 
that the agents had held Cotterman’s laptop was reasonable because 
of the intensive nature of a computer-forensics search and because of 
Agent Owen’s “reasonable diligence and speed in conducting the 
computer forensic examination.”77 
Overall, by concluding that the search was not particularly 
offensive, and in making no finding regarding the presence of 
reasonable suspicion,78 the court implicitly held that reasonable 
suspicion was not necessary for the search to actually be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the court reversed the trial 
court’s decision and denied Cotterman’s motion.79 
 
 71. Id. at 1079–83. 
 72. Id. at 1080. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1080–81. 
 76. Id. at 1082. 
 77. Id. at 1083 (internal quotation marks omitted). Agent Owen went so far as to work 
through both Saturday and Sunday. See supra Part III. 
 78. Id. at 1074. 
 79. Id. at 1084. 
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The Ninth Circuit erred in its analysis of the search in Cotterman 
and in its final holding that reasonable suspicion was not necessary. 
The Ninth Circuit should have engaged in a more-thorough 
reasonableness analysis, including the weighing of government and 
individual interests. Further, as part of its reasonableness analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit should have determined that the search in Cotterman 
was exhaustive and exploratory and therefore should have held that 
the search was “particularly offensive.” In so doing, the court should 
have found that reasonable suspicion was necessary to forensically 
search Cotterman’s computer. 
The court erred because it identified three categories of 
inappropriate border searches80 and created a rule that border 
searches are not inappropriate unless they fit within one of those 
three categories. The Ninth Circuit specifically based most of its 
opinion on the “particularly offensive” category. In following its 
categorical rule, the Ninth Circuit failed to perform a thorough 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.  
The Ninth Circuit’s approach was inadequate because proper 
Fourth Amendment analysis does not rely on “[c]omplex balancing 
tests” focused on different categories of searches.81 Rather, “[t]he 
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by 
‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”82  
While the Ninth Circuit discussed the government’s general 
interest in performing searches and seizures at the border,83 it 
insufficiently evaluated the government’s particular interest in 
excluding child pornography and decreasing child sex abuse. The 
Ninth Circuit also insufficiently addressed an individual’s privacy 
 
 80. The three categories were (1) “highly intrusive searches of a person,” (2) searches 
that destroy property, and (3) searches performed in a “particularly offensive manner.” Id. at 
1079–80. 
 81. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 82. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (quoting 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 83. Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1074–79. 
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interests in his laptop. Furthermore, while analysis to determine 
whether the search was performed in a “particularly offensive 
manner” may be an important part of a reasonableness analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that what makes a search 
“particularly offensive” is its exhaustive and exploratory nature, like 
the searches in Kremen and Go-Bart Importing.84  
If the court had performed its analysis appropriately, it would 
have concluded that a reasonable-suspicion standard is necessary to 
conduct forensic computer searches at the border; an individual’s 
privacy rights and the offensive, exhaustive nature of such searches 
outweigh the compelling government interest. 
A. Government Interest in Excluding Child Pornography 
Although the Cotterman court discussed the government’s 
general interest in protecting its borders and excluding contraband,85 
the court should have discussed the government’s particular interest 
in searching computers to discover contraband implicating child-sex 
crimes.86 Because privacy interests in a personal laptop should 
outweigh the government’s general interest in border security, the 
Ninth Circuit would have been better able to weigh the strong 
government interest in these types of searches if it had considered 
the true government interest of protecting against the sexual 
exploitation of children. 
The government has a strong interest in preventing human 
trafficking in sex, both because of the growing problem of human 
trafficking and because of the vulnerability of its victims.87 To 
illustrate, the International Labor Office estimated that in the year 
2000, approximately 1.8 million children worldwide were being 
exploited for prostitution and pornography worldwide.88 In response 
 
 84. See supra Part II.B. 
 85. See supra Part II.B. 
 86. Contraband found in computers may include child pornography as well as terrorist 
plans. Erick Lucadamo, Reading Your Mind at the Border: Searching Memorialized Thoughts 
and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL. L. REV. 541, 574 (2009) 
(citations omitted). 
 87. Hillary Clinton, Letter from Secretary, in 2011 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164217.htm (“[T]he United 
States and the international community have made the solemn commitment to fight this 
scourge wherever it exists.”). 
 88. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, FACTS ON COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN 1 (2003), available at http://www.wotclef.org/documents/ 
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to this growing problem, Congress has passed laws criminalizing 
child-sex tourism89 and possession and distribution of child 
pornography90 to diminish the demand for commercial-sexual-
exploitation of children.91 In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court 
itself recognized that the reasons for prohibiting possession and 
distribution of child pornography are compelling.92 Because the 
government has a compelling interest in prohibiting possession and 
distribution of child pornography, the government has a compelling 
interest in excluding child pornography from admittance into the 
United States. Thus, the government has an interest in searching 
computers to discover child pornography as computers enter the 
country. 
B. Individual’s Expectation of Privacy in Laptops 
Additionally, the Cotterman court failed to adequately address an 
individual’s privacy interests in his laptop.93 In addressing individual 
privacy interests, the Ninth Circuit merely cited Arnold and failed to  
adequately discuss the unusually high privacy interest that individuals 
maintain in their computers. 
A quick discussion of computer characteristics and use reveals 
why individual privacy interests in computers are so high. Computers 
are distinctly different from traditional “papers and effects” protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.94 For example, computers made in 2005 
have storage capacities equivalent to about forty-million pages of 
text.95 Because of such vast storage capability, computers hold almost 
infinite personal information and “should not be grouped with . . . 
wallets, purses, luggage, and other simple containers.”96 
 
fs_sexualexploit_0303.pdf. 
 89. Child-sex tourism occurs when a person travels to a foreign country for the purpose 
of engaging in sex with a child. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: 
OPERATION PREDATOR—TARGETING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL CRIMES (Nov. 19, 
2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/predator.htm. 
 90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). 
 91. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PREVENTION: FIGHTING SEX TRAFFICKING BY CURBING 
DEMAND FOR PROSTITUTION (June 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2011/ 
167224.htm. 
 92. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982). 
 93. See supra Part IV. 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 95. Kerr, supra note 1, at 542. 
 96. Bret E. Rasner, Comment, International Travelers Beware: No Reasonable Suspicion 
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Searches of computers reveal far more personal information than 
traditional paper files. From a computer search, the government 
could find out what websites a person has visited and read, who the 
person associates with, when the person is active on the internet, and 
a host of other very personalized, detailed information. 
Because of computers’ unique characteristics, many courts and 
scholars have recognized the need for a “special approach” when 
analyzing searches and seizures of computers in general.97 Thus, 
because of computers’ unique capacity to store information, an 
individual’s privacy interests invoked by a forensic search should be 
distinguished from other cases that reject a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; the court should hold that a forensic search implicates the 
“dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched.”98 
 For example, the traditional lack of expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle,99 as discussed in Flores-Montano,100 is clearly distinguishable 
from the expectation of privacy in computers. Because of the massive  
amount of intimate information computers store, searches of 
computers threaten “dignity and privacy interests”101 more than 
searches of cars. 
Notwithstanding such a high expectation of privacy in a 
computer, Arnold recognized that “a search which occurs in an 
otherwise ordinary manner, is . . . [not unreasonable] simply due to 
the storage capacity of the object being searched.”102 Therefore, even 
the particularly high privacy interests in a laptop are not, by 
themselves, sufficient to make unreasonable a border search of a 
computer. However, a search that does not occur in an ordinary 
manner, but that is particularly offensive, would tip the scale towards 
finding an unreasonable search. 
 
Needed to Search Your Electronic Storage Devices at the Border, 3 PHX. L. REV. 669, 697 
(2010); see also S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 2(4) (2008). 
 97. Kerr, supra note 1, at 572; Smyth, supra note 11, at 71 (citing United States v. 
Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 
1982)); Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 75, 104 (1994)). 
 98. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 99. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985) (discussing the decreased 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle because of the automobile exception). 
 100. See supra Part II.B. 
 101. See id. 
 102. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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C. Particularly Offensive Manner of Forensic Searches 
The Ninth Circuit failed to perform a thorough reasonableness 
analysis because it merely likened the search in Cotterman to the 
manual computer search in Arnold, notwithstanding the significant 
differences between the two searches. These two searches are 
significantly different under a reasonableness analysis because both 
the process and the fruits of a forensic computer search are 
significantly different from those of a traditional search of documents 
or containers.103 
A manual computer search, like that in Arnold, is similar to a 
traditional search of documents and containers, such as searching 
through stacks of papers contained in luggage or in a briefcase. Such 
a search is significantly limited by a law-enforcement officer’s time 
and ability to read everything on site. In contrast, a forensic 
computer search involves copying a hard drive and running scripts to 
evaluate the information on the hard drive.104 The duration of a 
forensics examination will last as long “as the analyst has to give 
it.”105 With a forensics search, the government could 
translate any documents in a foreign language, ensure that none of 
the seemingly innocuous pictures are actually encrypted messages, 
verify the licenses on any music or movies on the computer, review 
financial logs for evidence of insider trading, read email 
correspondence to ensure that there is no communication with 
known criminals—the list of possible [governmental] “concerns” is 
endless.106 
Thus, forensic searches would be similar to the government 
making copies of every sheet in a stack of papers and having no 
restrictions whatsoever on the time and resources used to read 
through and analyze every detail found in the papers. Furthermore, 
as discussed in Part V.B, computers have the capacity to reveal far 
 
 103. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 538. 
 104. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 105. Kerr, supra note 1, at 544. 
 106. Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1086 n.5 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CUSTOMS 
AND BORDER PROTECTION DIRECTIVE No. 3340-049 (August 20, 2009) (“Searches of 
electronic devices help detect evidence relating to terrorism and other national security 
matters, human and bulk cash smuggling, contraband, and child pornography. They can also 
reveal information about financial and commercial crimes, such as those relating to copyright, 
trademark and export control violations.”)). 
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more information than most physical documents or containers. Such 
a search would be exhaustive, exploratory, and therefore, particularly 
offensive. 
Overall, because of the exhaustive nature of forensic searches, the 
search in Cotterman should be distinguished from that in Arnold. 
The search in Arnold consisted of an agent looking at files on the 
computer in the presence of the defendant.107 In contrast, the 
Cotterman search consisted of agents making copies of the hard 
drives and subjecting them to programming scripts that ran for 
hours.108 A forensic search is far more capable of revealing vast 
amounts of highly personal information than the mere opening of a 
container or browsing of files by a human-being. Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit should have concluded that the forensic search of 
Cotterman’s computer was particularly offensive. 
 Although the government interest in safeguarding against child 
sex trafficking and child pornography is compelling, the reasonably 
high expectation of privacy in a computer and the exhaustive and 
offensive nature of a forensics search weigh in favor of requiring 
reasonable suspicion for forensic searches. The Cotterman decision 
permits a border agent to perform a forensics search on any 
computer entering the country without any sort of suspicion. 
Following Cotterman, no Fourth Amendment barrier prevents the 
government from forensically examining every computer entering the 
country to verify that its owner is not engaged in criminal activity of 
any type. Such searches would be “exhaustive,” “general exploratory 
search[es]”109 and would violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
of individual privacy. These exhaustive searches will likely affect many 
more individuals, particularly considering the high rate of 
international travel110 and the increasing ownership of laptops. Thus, 
to protect an individual’s right to privacy and to avoid unreasonable, 
exhaustive searches, a reasonable-suspicion standard should be 
required to perform a computer forensics examination under the 
border-search doctrine. 
 
 107. See supra Part II.C. 
 108. See supra Part III. 
 109. See supra Part II.B. 
 110. On an average day, CBP processes 965,167 people entering the country. CBP, ON 
A TYPICAL DAY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010 (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/ 
cgov/about/accomplish/previous_year/fy10_stats/typical_day_fy2010.xml. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit erred in Cotterman by holding that a border 
search of a laptop in a forensic computer laboratory is constitutional, 
absent reasonable suspicion. The court’s analysis lacked the necessary 
depth, particularly regarding Cotterman’s privacy expectations in his 
laptop. The Ninth Circuit should have concluded that the search of 
Cotterman’s laptop was particularly offensive to privacy interests and 
was reasonable without a showing of reasonable suspicion. After the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding, the government is free to perform extensive 
searches on any laptop entering the country for any reason, thus 
allowing the government access to practically infinite amounts of 





 111. Smyth, supra note 11, at 71. 
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